Hsee, C. K., Loewenstein, G. F., Blount, S., &Bazerman, M. H. (1999). Preference reversals between joint and separate evaluations of options: a review and theoretical analysis.

Arguably, all judgments and decisions are made in 1 (or some combination) of 2 basic evaluation modes—joint evaluation mode (JE), in which multiple options are presented simultaneously and evaluated comparatively, or separate evaluation mode (SE), in which options are presented in isolation and evaluated separately. This article reviews recent literature showing that people evaluate options differently and exhibit reversals of preferences for options between JE and SE. The authors propose an explanation for the JE/SE reversal based on a principle called the evaluability hypothesis. The hypothesis posits that it is more difficult to evaluate the desirability of values on some attributes than on others and that, compared with easy-to-evaluate attributes, difficult-to-evaluate attributes have a greater impact in JE than in SE.

 

 

Hsee, C. K., Loewenstein, G. F., Blount, S., &Bazerman, M. H. (1999). Preference reversals between joint and separate evaluations of options: a review and theoretical analysis. Psychological bulletin, 125(5), 576-590. 

 

Bryan, C. J., &Hershfield, H. E. (2012). You owe it to yourself: Boosting retirement saving with a responsibility-based appeal.

This reprinted article originally appeared in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2012(AUG), 141 (3), 429-432. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2011-26496-001). Americans are not saving enough for retirement. Previous research suggests that this is due, in part, to people’s tendency to think of the future self as more like another person than like the present self, making saving feel like giving money away rather than like investing in oneself. Using objective employer saving data, a field experiment capitalized on this phenomenon to increase saving. It compared the effectiveness of a novel message—one appealing to people’s sense of “social” responsibility to their future selves—with a more traditional appeal to people’s sense of rational self-interest. The social-responsibility-to-the-future-self message resulted in larger increases in saving than the self-interest message, but only to the extent that people felt a strong “social” connection to their future selves. These results broaden our understanding of the psychology of moral responsibility and refine our understanding of the role of future-self continuity in fostering intertemporal patience. They further demonstrate how understanding conceptions of the self over time can suggest solutions to important and challenging policy problems.

 

 

Bryan, C. J., &Hershfield, H. E. (2012). You owe it to yourself: Boosting retirement saving with a responsibility-based appeal. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141(3), 429-432.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0026173

 

 

Hershfield, H. E. (2011). Future self‐continuity: How conceptions of the future self transform intertemporal choice.Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1235(1), 30-43.

With life expectancy dramatically increasing throughout much of the world, people have to make choices with a longer future in mind than they ever had to before. Yet, many indicators suggest that undersaving for the long term often occurs: in America, for instance, many individuals will not be able to maintain their preretirement standard of living in retirement. Previous research has tried to understand problems with intertemporal choice by focusing on the ways in which people treat present and future rewards. In this paper, the author reviews a burgeoning body of theoretical and empirical work that takes a different viewpoint, one that focuses on how perceptions of the self over time can dramatically affect decision making. Specifically, when the future self shares similarities with the present self, when it is viewed in vivid and realistic terms, and when it is seen in a positive light, people are more willing to make choices today that may benefit them at some point in the years to come.

 

 

Hershfield, H. E. (2011). Future self‐continuity: How conceptions of the future self transform intertemporal choice.Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1235(1), 30-43.

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06201.x

 

 

Read, D., Frederick, S., Orsel, B., &Rahman, J. (2005). Four score and seven years from now: The date/delay effect in temporal discounting. Management Science, 51(9), 1326-1335.

We describe a new anomaly in intertemporal choice—the “date/delay effect”: discount rates that are imputed when time is described using calendar dates (e.g., on October 17) are markedly lower than those revealed when future outcomes are described in terms of the corresponding delay (e.g., in six months). Date deions not only reduce discount rates, but also affect the implied shape of the discount function: When inferred from intertemporal choices between options referenced by calendar dates, the discount function appears markedly less hyperbolic. We discuss potential psychological bases of the date/delay effect, its implications, and other modes of temporal reference.

 

 

Read, D., Frederick, S., Orsel, B., &Rahman, J. (2005). Four score and seven years from now: The date/delay effect in temporal discounting. Management Science, 51(9), 1326-1335.

https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1050.0412

 

 

Hershfield, H. E., Goldstein, D. G., Sharpe, W. F., Fox, J., Yeykelis, L., Carstensen, L. L., &Bailenson, J. N. (2011). Increasing saving behavior through age-progressed renderings of the future self.

Many people fail to save what they will need for retirement. Research on excessive discounting of the future suggests that removing the lure of immediate rewards by precommitting to decisions or elaborating the value of future rewards both can make decisions more future oriented. The authors explore a third and complementary route, one that deals not with present and future rewards but with present and future selves. In line with research that shows that people may fail, because of a lack of belief or imagination, to identify with their future selves, the authors propose that allowing people to interact with age-progressed renderings of themselves will cause them to allocate more resources to the future. In four studies, participants interacted with realistic computer renderings of their future selves using immersive virtual reality hardware and interactive decision aids. In all cases, those who interacted with their virtual future selves exhibited an increased tendency to accept later monetary rewards over immediate ones.

 

 

Hershfield, H. E., Goldstein, D. G., Sharpe, W. F., Fox, J., Yeykelis, L., Carstensen, L. L., &Bailenson, J. N. (2011). Increasing saving behavior through age-progressed renderings of the future self. Journal of Marketing Research, 48(SPL), S23-S37.

https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.48.SPL.S23  

Quoidbach, J., &Dunn, E. W. (2013). Give it up: A strategy for combating hedonic adaptation. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 4(5), 563-568.

The present research provides the first evidence that temporarily giving up something pleasurable may provide an effective route to happiness. Participants were asked to eat a piece of chocolate during two lab sessions, held 1week apart. During the intervening week, we randomly assigned them to abstain from chocolate or to eat as much of it as possible, while a control group received no special instructions related to their chocolate consumption. At the second lab session, participants who had temporarily given up chocolate savored it significantly more and experienced more positive moods after eating it, compared to those in either of the other two conditions. Many cultural and religious practices entail temporarily giving up something pleasurable, and our research suggests that such self-denial may carry ironic benefits for well-being by combating hedonic adaptation.

 

 

Quoidbach, J., &Dunn, E. W. (2013). Give it up: A strategy for combating hedonic adaptation. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 4(5), 563-568.

https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550612473489

 

 

Lee, L., Frederick, S., &Ariely, D. (2006). Try it, you& #39;ll like it: The influence of expectation, consumption, and revelation on preferences for beer. Psychological science, 17(12), 1054-1058.

Patrons of a pub evaluated regular beer and “MIT brew” (regular beer plus a few drops of balsamic vinegar) in one of three conditions. One group tasted the samples blind (the secret ingredient was never disclosed). A second group was informed of the contents before tasting. A third group learned of the secret ingredient immediately after tasting, but prior to indicating their preference. Not surprisingly, preference for the MIT brew was higher in the blind condition than in either of the two disclosure conditions. However, the timing of the information mattered substantially. Disclosure of the secret ingredient significantly reduced preference only when the disclosure preceded tasting, suggesting that disclosure affected preferences by influencing the experience itself, rather than by acting as an independent negative input or by modifying retrospective interpretation of the experience.

 

 

 

Lee, L., Frederick, S., &Ariely, D. (2006). Try it, you’ll like it: The influence of expectation, consumption, and revelation on preferences for beer. Psychological science, 17(12), 1054-1058.

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01829.x 

 

 

Ariely, D., &Loewenstein, G. (2006). The heat of the moment: The effect of sexual arousal on sexual decision making. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19(2), 87-98.

Despite the social importance of decisions taken in the “heat of the moment,” very little research has examined the effect of sexual arousal on judgment and decision making. Here we examine the effect of sexual arousal, induced by self‐stimulation, on judgments and hypothetical decisions made by male college students. Students were assigned to be in either a state of sexual arousal or a neutral state and were asked to: (1) indicate how appealing they find a wide range of sexual stimuli and activities, (2) report their willingness to engage in morally questionable behavior in order to obtain sexual gratification, and (3) describe their willingness to engage in unsafe sex when sexually aroused. The results show that sexual arousal had a strong impact on all three areas of judgment and decision making, demonstrating the importance of situational forces on preferences, as well as subjects’ inability to predict these influences on their own behavior.

 

 

Ariely, D., &Loewenstein, G. (2006). The heat of the moment: The effect of sexual arousal on sexual decision making. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19(2), 87-98.

https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.501

 

 

Van den Bergh, B., Dewitte, S., &Warlop, L. (2008). Bikinis instigate generalized impatience in intertemporal choice.Journal of Consumer Research, 35(1), 85-97.

Neuroscientific studies demonstrate that erotic stimuli activate the reward circuitry processing monetary and drug rewards. Theoretically, a general reward system may give rise to nonspecific effects: exposure to “hot stimuli” from one domain may thus affect decisions in a different domain. We show that exposure to sexy cues leads to more impatience in intertemporal choice between monetary rewards. Highlighting the role of a general reward circuitry, we demonstrate that individuals with a sensitive reward system are more susceptible to the effect of sex cues, that the effect generalizes to nonmonetary rewards, and that satiation attenuates the effect.

 

 

Van den Bergh, B., Dewitte, S., &Warlop, L. (2008). Bikinis instigate generalized impatience in intertemporal choice.Journal of Consumer Research, 35(1), 85-97.

https://doi.org/10.1086/525505

 

 

Carlson, K., Kim, J., Lusardi, A., &Camerer, C. F. (2015). Bankruptcy rates among NFL players with short-lived income spikes. American Economic Review, 105(5), 381-84.

We test for consumption smoothing using bankruptcy data on players in the National Football League (NFL), who typically earn several million dollars during an income spike that lasts a few years. The life-cycle hypothesis predicts that players should save substantially while playing and then have little risk of bankruptcy post-NFL. However, players in our sample begin to file for bankruptcy soon after they stop playing and continue filing at a high rate through at least the first 12 years of retirement. Players’ total earnings and career lengths have surprisingly little effect on the risk of bankruptcy.

 

 

Carlson, K., Kim, J., Lusardi, A., &Camerer, C. F. (2015). Bankruptcy rates among NFL players with short-lived income spikes. American Economic Review, 105(5), 381-84.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20151038