Romer, T., &Rosenthal, H. (1978). Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo. Public choice, 33(4), 27-43.

Financial support was provided, in part, by The Spencer Foundation. We thank M. Harris, J. Lave, S. Salop, and participants in workshops at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and at Queen’s University for helpful comments.

 

 

Romer, T., &Rosenthal, H. (1978). Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo. Public choice, 33(4), 27-43.

https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03187594

 

Romer, T., &Rosenthal, H. (1982). Median voters or budget maximizers: Evidence from school expenditure referenda. Economic Inquiry, 20(4), 556-578.

Some readers may have found these results of greater interest were we able to confirm the directional hypotheses of the certainty setter model in addition to finding that spending is “related” to the reversion – the much weaker prediction of the uncertainty model. Yet the failure of the certainty

 

When base elections were optional, their infrequent occurrence might be expected under either a median voter or a setter model. For those districts that did hold base elections, the observations appear consistent with a setter model, but are either inexplicable by or inconsistent with a median voter model. Finally, both (a) the relationship between the number of budget elections and the presence of base elections, and (b) the outcome of mandatory base elections in 1978 provide a set of observations that are challenging to either model.

 

A similar challenge was posed by our investigation of budget elections when we called attention to the inadequacy of static, full information models. Rather than resolving the question of the simple setter model against the simple median voter model, our results indicate that both may be inappropriate and that endeavors dealing with complexities omitted here are warranted.

 

 

Romer, T., &Rosenthal, H. (1982). Median voters or budget maximizers: Evidence from school expenditure referenda. Economic Inquiry, 20(4), 556-578.

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1982.tb00366.x

 

Weingast, B. R., &Moran, M. J. (1983). Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission. Journal of Political Economy, 91(5), 765-800.

This paper extends Stigler and Peltzman’s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature. The model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications. The paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior. The first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion; the second assumes that Congress controls agency decisions. The recent behavior of the Federal Trade Commission provides the empirical setting. Substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model, including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over FTC decisions.

 

 

Weingast, B. R., &Moran, M. J. (1983). Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission. Journal of Political Economy, 91(5), 765-800.

https://doi.org/10.1086/261181

 

Vaubel, R. (1994). The political economy of centralization and the European Community. Public Choice, 81(1-2), 151-190.

Since 1972, the share of central government expenditure in total public expenditure has continued to increase in most industrial countries. In an international cross-section analysis, it has a significant positive effect on the share of government spending in GDP. The actors who have an interest in centralization are analyzed. The dynamics of centralization are attributed to a response asymmetry and two thresholds. “Popitz’ law” of the attraction of the larger budget is tested with respect to the EC Commission: high-ranking politicians come mainly from the smaller member states. The voters’ attitudes toward European unification are analyzed in a pooled regression.

Ten years hence, 80% of our economic legislation, and perhaps even our fiscal and social legislation as well, will be of Community origin

 

 

Vaubel, R. (1994). The political economy of centralization and the European Community. Public Choice, 81(1-2), 151-190. 

https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053271

Kirchgässner, G., &Pommerehne, W. W. (1996). Tax harmonization and tax competition in the European Union: Lessons from Switzerland. Journal of Public Economics, 60(3), 351-371.

This paper presents empirical evidence on individual income tax competition in Switzerland. Tax competition has some influence on the spread of people with high income over the cantons, and it is partly capitalised in dwelling rents. However, it neither leads to a collapse of public good supply nor makes redistribution by the fiscal authorities impossible. Thus, if tax competition works well in Switzerland there is no reason why it should have disastrous effects in a future European Union.

 

 

Kirchgässner, G., &Pommerehne, W. W. (1996). Tax harmonization and tax competition in the European Union: Lessons from Switzerland. Journal of Public Economics, 60(3), 351-371.

https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(95)01556-6

 

Ashworth, J., Heyndels, B., &Smolders, C. (2002). Redistribution as a local public good: an empirical test for Flemish municipalities. Kyklos, 55(1), 27-56.

Redistribution is typically viewed as a task of the central government. However, in most federal countries local governments do have some discretion in redistribution policy. The main theoretical argument for this is that redistribution may be a local public good (Pauly 1973). Using data on Flemish municipalities, we present a first empirical test of Pauly’s assumption. We find that the willingness to redistribute is negatively affected by the geographical dimension of the responsible government. We extend the notion of distance, considering also sociological, cultural, income and political distances between donors and recipients. We find that, with the exception of income, these are relevant determinants of welfare policy, though they do not always have the predicted effect.

 

 

Ashworth, J., Heyndels, B., &Smolders, C. (2002). Redistribution as a local public good: an empirical test for Flemish municipalities. Kyklos, 55(1), 27-56.

https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6435.00176

 

Hancock*, P. A., &Weaver, J. L. (2005). On time distortion under stress. Theoretical issues in ergonomics science, 6(2), 193-211.

Under conditions of extreme and life-threatening stress, people often report distortions of time. These distortional experiences are critical since, axiomatically, they occur in circumstances where small variations in behavior can mean the difference between survival and extinction. The present work examines the spectrum of evidence concerning such phenomena including observations from real-world events such as combat, ejection from high-performance aircraft, driving in dangerous environments and from less stressful, yet informative laboratory procedures. A contextual theory is promulgated which postulates that in addition to draining attentional resources, stress prevents the efficient production of such resources. The stress-depleted resources which remain are directed to task-relevant activities and consequently attention to time-based cues is minimized resulting in distortion effects for both time-in-passing and for time recollection in memory. A number of practical observations are advanced concerning the performance of professionals who are likely to meet such conditions in their occupations including those in aerospace, military, fire-fighting, law enforcement, and medical emergency service operations. In conclusion, we present a number of future research strategies that may be enacted in order to evaluate this ephemeral, real-world phenomenon.

 

 

Hancock*, P. A., &Weaver, J. L. (2005). On time distortion under stress. Theoretical issues in ergonomics science, 6(2), 193-211.

https://doi.org/10.1080/14639220512331325747 

 

Salovey, P., &Mayer, J. D. (1990). Emotional intelligence. Imagination, cognition and personality, 9(3), 185-211.

This article presents a framework for emotional intelligence, a set of skills hypothesized to contribute to the accurate appraisal and expression of emotion in oneself and in others, the effective regulation of emotion in self and others, and the use of feelings to motivate, plan, and achieve in one’s life. We start by reviewing the debate about the adaptive versus maladaptive qualities of emotion. We then explore the literature on intelligence, and especially social intelligence, to examine the place of emotion in traditional intelligence conceptions. A framework for integrating the research on emotion-related skills is then described. Next, we review the components of emotional intelligence. To conclude the review, the role of emotional intelligence in mental health is discussed and avenues for further investigation are suggested.

 

 

Salovey, P., &Mayer, J. D. (1990). Emotional intelligence. Imagination, cognition and personality, 9(3), 185-211.

https://doi.org/10.2190/DUGG-P24E-52WK-6CDG