Ng, Y. K. (1997). A case for happiness, cardinalism, and interpersonal comparability. The Economic Journal, 107(445), 1848-1858.

Modern economists are strongly biased in favour of preference (in contrast to happiness), ordinalism, and against interpersonal comparison. I wish to argue for the opposite. The proposed change in perspective has important conceptual and policy significance, as also evidenced in the papers by Frank and Oswald in this issue that I strongly endorse.

 

Neoclassical economists used more subjective terms like satisfaction, marginal utility, and even happiness, pleasure, and pain. After the indifference‐curve or ordinalism revolution in the 1930s, modern economists are very adverse to the more subjective concepts and very hostile to cardinal utility and interpersonal comparisons of utility. They prefer to use the more objective concepts like preference and choice. In a very important sense, these changes represent an important methodological advance, making economic analysis based on more objective grounds. However, the change or correction has been carried to an excess, making economics unable…

 

 

Ng, Y. K. (1997). A case for happiness, cardinalism, and interpersonal comparability. The Economic Journal, 107(445), 1848-1858.

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00087.x 

Ng*, Y. K. (1978). Economic growth and social welfare: the need for a complete study of happiness. Kyklos, 31(4), 575-587.

Does economic growth increase social welfare (happiness)? Answers to such questions can only be provided by a complete analysis of all the objective, subjective, and institutional effects. All measures originate from the subjective world, working through the institutional setting to affect the objective world, the institutional setting and/or the subjective world. Due to the increasing complexity of the modern society, it is likely that more problems are going to involve significant institutional and subjective effects, making a complete multidisciplinary study more necessary. As an introduction to this argument, the Harrod‐Hirsch concept of positional goods and its implications on the desirability of economic growth are analysed geometrically and extended. A simple method to reduce the difficulty of comparability in happiness surveys is also suggested.

 

 

Ng*, Y. K. (1978). Economic growth and social welfare: the need for a complete study of happiness. Kyklos, 31(4), 575-587.

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1978.tb00660.x

 

Huppert, F. A., & Baylis, N. (2004). Well–being: towards an integration of psychology, neurobiology and social science.

The study of well–being is a rapidly evolving field, and an exquisite example of a truly multidisciplinary endeavour. Two of the strongest strands have emerged from recent research on positive psychology and on social capital, but the field reaches well beyond these domains. We summarize some of the major themes that unite these different approaches and disciplines, highlighting both commonalities and controversies. The five themes on which we focus are: (i) evolution and development; (ii) the nature of wellbeing; (iii) well–being and capabilities; (iv) the relationship between health and well–being; and (v) the implications of the findings of the research for intervention strategies and public policies.

 

 

Huppert, F. A., & Baylis, N. (2004). Well–being: towards an integration of psychology, neurobiology and social science. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 359(1449), 1447-1451.
https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2004.1520

Ryff, C. D. (1989). Happiness is everything, or is it? Explorations on the meaning of psychological well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(6), 1069-1081.

Reigning measures of psychological well-being have little theoretical grounding, despite an extensive literature on the contours of positive functioning. Aspects of well-being derived from this literature (i.e., self-acceptance, positive relations with others, autonomy, environmental mastery, purpose in life, and personal growth) were operationalized. Three hundred and twenty-one men and women, divided among young, middle-aged, and older adults, rated themselves on these measures along with six instruments prominent in earlier studies (i.e., affect balance, life satisfaction, self-esteem, morale, locus of control, depression). Results revealed that positive relations with others, autonomy, purpose in life, and personal growth were not strongly tied to prior assessment indexes, thereby supporting the claim that key aspects of positive functioning have not been represented in the empirical arena. Furthermore, age profiles revealed a more differentiated pattern of well-being than is evident in prior research.

 

 

 

Ryff, C. D. (1989). Happiness is everything, or is it? Explorations on the meaning of psychological well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(6), 1069-1081.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.57.6.1069

 

 

Kahneman, D., &Thaler, R. H. (2006). Anomalies: Utility maximization and experienced utility. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(1), 221-234.

 

In this column, we discuss a version of the utility maximization hypothesis that can be tested—and we find that it is false. We review empirical challenges to utility maximization, which return to the old question of whether preferences optimize the experience of outcomes. Much of this work has focused on a necessary condition for utility-maximizing choices: an ability of economic agents to make accurate, or at least unbiased, forecasts of the hedonic outcomes of potential choices. The research we review shows that this condition is not satisfied: people do not always know what they will like; they often make systematic errors in predicting their future experience of outcomes and, as a result, fail to maximize their experienced utility. We discuss four areas in which errors of hedonic forecasting and choice have been documented: 1) where the emotional or motivational state of the agent is very different at t0 and at t1; 2) where the nature of the decision focuses attention on aspects of the outcome that will not be salient when it is actually experienced; 3) when choices are made on the basis of flawed evaluations of past experiences; and 4) when people forecast their future adjustment to new life circumstances.

 

 

Kahneman, D., &Thaler, R. H. (2006). Anomalies: Utility maximization and experienced utility. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(1), 221-234.

DOI: 10.1257/089533006776526076

 

Lewin, S. B. (1996). Economics and psychology: Lessons for our own day from the early twentieth century. Journal of Economic Literature, 34(3), 1293-1323.

 

 

초록 없음

 

 

 

 

Lewin, S. B. (1996). Economics and psychology: Lessons for our own day from the early twentieth century. Journal of Economic Literature, 34(3), 1293-1323. 

 

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2729503  

Bosman, R., &Van Winden, F. (2010). Global risk, investment and emotions. Economica, 77(307), 451-471.

We investigate a novel dynamic choice problem in an experiment where emotions are measured through self‐reports. The choice problem concerns the investment of an amount of money in a safe option and a risky option when there is a ‘global risk’ of losing all earnings, from both options, including any return from the risky option. Our key finding is that global risk can reduce the amount invested in the risky option. This result cannot be explained by Expected Utility or by its main contenders, Rank‐Dependent Utility and Cumulative Prospect Theory. An explanation is offered by taking account of emotions, using the emotion data from the experiment and recent psychological findings.

 


Bosman, R., &Van Winden, F. (2010). Global risk, investment and emotions. Economica, 77(307), 451-471.

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2008.00752.x

 

 

 

 

 

MacLeod, W. B. (1996). Decision, contract, and emotion: Some economics for a complex and confusing world. Canadian Journal of Economics, 788-810.

This essay illustrates that if Savage’s small world assumption is relaxed, one can construct a theory of bounded rationality that incorporates some of the insights from recent work in cognitive psychology. The theory can be used to explain why contracts are incomplete and the existence of endowment effects in exchange. /// Décision, contrat et émotion: une économique pour un monde complexe et confus. Ce mémoire illustre le fait que si l’on relaxe le postulat du petit monde de Savage, on peut construire une théorie de la rationalité limitée qui incorpore queloques unes des perspectives en provenance des travaux récents en psychologie cognitive. La théorie peut être utilisée pour expliquer l’existence de contrats incomplets et d’effets de dotation dans l’échange.

 


MacLeod, W. B. (1996). Decision, contract, and emotion: Some economics for a complex and confusing world. Canadian Journal of Economics, 788-810.

DOI: 10.2307/136215